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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance practices have been
debated for more than 50 years, spawning
numerous reform proposals aimed at improving the
system of checks and balances built into the
corporate model to protect shareholders’ interest
against possible management abuse. Highly visible
troubles at publicly traded companies have led to
the passage of recently enacted laws that add more
rigor and formality to the governance process by,
among other things, improving independence
among governance participants and codifying the
responsibilities of certain of those participants. Most
of these reform proposals and new laws are aimed at
protecting investors in publicly traded firms.
Relatively few Tenth District community banks,
however, are publicly traded or are subject to new
laws that would require them to change their
corporate governance practices. Indeed, many are
small in asset size, family-owned, closely held, and
owner-managed. Given these characteristics, the
governance process at community banks tends to be
less formal and structured than that required for
publicly traded companies. What then has been the
impact of corporate governance reform on
community banks? Have community banks
perceived benefits from the practices recommended
by proponents of a more formal governance
process? Although not required to do so, have
community banks adopted any of the practices
required of publicly traded companies?
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This paper uses information gathered from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 2004 Tenth
District Community Bank Survey (Community
Bank Survey or Survey) to answer these questions.
1
The analysis that follows is divided into two
sections. The first section briefly includes
background information and definitions that
provide the basis for the governance areas covered
by the Community Bank Survey. The second
section summarizes survey findings for these
governance areas and offers some conclusions on




Like many other terms of art, there is no one
generally accepted definition for corporate
governance. Some are quite lengthy, while others
are abbreviated. The definition used here is:
“Governance involves many players, each
with specific assigned responsibilities to
ensure that the [risk management] system
as a whole is sufficient to support the
business strategy and ensure the
effectiveness of the systems of internal
control.”
2
Governance Players and Their Roles
Governance includes many participants internal
and external to the corporation. Included among
the internal players are officers, significant
shareholders, and directors (a listing of internal
players and their governance roles and
responsibilities can be found at Appendix A).
External influences on governance include auditing
firms, regulatory agencies, securities exchanges,
rating agencies, and others (a listing of these players
can be found at Appendix B).
3 Together, these
participants form a system of checks and balances.
Among this system’s many purposes are to control
the principal-agent problem inherent in the
corporate business form and protect shareholder
interests; to provide, monitor, and evaluate the
corporation’s daily management; to plan for its
future; to ensure its fair and accurate financial
reporting; and to make sure it complies with laws
and regulations.
4 Whether the corporation is a large
automotive manufacturer, a hotelier, or a small
community bank, these basic governance objectives
are the same.
Implicit in the governance process are the
assumptions that its participants act independently
of one another, that they act ethically, that they
have the necessary skill sets to perform their duties,
and that they are active in meeting their
responsibilities. Indeed, the intent of many “best
practices” set forth by good governance proponents
is to make operational these implied assumptions. It
is these best practices that underlie the 26
governance questions included in the Community
Bank Survey. These questions focused on:
• Board size and composition 
• Board committee structure
• Board membership and recruitment
• Director compensation and ownership
• Senior management team succession 
• Other governance matters 
Each governance topic is discussed in turn,
starting with a brief description of why proponents
advocate certain practices as a way to achieve more
effective governance. This introduction is followed
by a review of Community Bank Survey governance
data pertaining to the practices. Because ownership
structure and size can influence the governance
process, survey data are disaggregated by family and
non-family ownership and within these ownership
categories, smaller and larger banks.
5 
2004 COMMUNITY BANK SURVEY
RESULTS
6
Board Size and Composition
Board size. National or state banking laws set the
minimum and maximum number of directors that
can sit on a bank’s board. For banks in most Tenth
District states, the minimum is three, and theTable 1
Community Bank Board Size and Composition
Assets< $150M Assets>$150M
All Responses Family Non-Family Family Non-Family
Median board size  7 7 7 9 11
Percent of banks reporting no change  61.37 65.53 57.89 54.76 37.50
in board size over the last five years.
Percent of banks reporting increase 16.20 15.53 14.03 16.67 31.25
in board size over the last five years.
Percent of banks reporting decreased 22.43 18.93 28.07 28.57 31.25
board size over the last five years.
Median number of outside directors. 3 2 4 4 7
Percent of boards with  42.24 30.76 67.24 47.22 85.71
outside directors a majority.
Percent of banks reporting no change in 65.92 71.78 60.71 57.50 31.25
number of outside directors over 
the last five years.
Percent of banks reporting increase 13.69 12.87 12.50 10.00 37.50
in number of outside directors over 
the last five years.
Percent of banks reporting decrease 20.38 15.34 26.79 32.50 31.25
in number of outside directors over
the last five years.
Source: Survey of Community Banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District
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maximum is 25 board members.
7 Within this
range, it is left to the discretion of individual banks
to determine an appropriate board size.
Although many factors may enter into a bank’s
decision regarding appropriate board size, two
important ones are its size/operational complexity
and the maximum number of directors the
organizers believe can support effective decision-
making. Large size and operational complexity may
place a greater workload on directors. Size and
complexity may also require greater diversity of
experience among the directorate in order to
explore fully issues associated with business
decisions. Each of these may make a larger board
necessary. Offsetting this need for a larger board is
the ability to reach consensus. Too large a board
may be unwieldy, making it difficult to come to
agreement and take decisive action. Proponents of
good governance tend to focus on this last factor,
recommending smaller rather than larger boards. 
Table 1 reports board size information for those
responding to the Community Bank Survey. Data
suggest that boards at community banks tend to be
relatively small and near the lower end of what
banking laws allow. The data also show that board
size stayed relatively constant at a majority of banks
during the last five years, with the exception of
larger, non-family-owned banks. Additionally,
when board size changed, the overall tendency was
for boards to shrink (the proportion of banks
reporting a decrease in board size exceeded those
reporting an increase over the last five years) at all
banks except large, non-family-owned banks where
the proportion of banks reporting an increase in
board size equaled that reporting a decrease.  
Board composition. Outside directors bring
diversity of knowledge, skills, and experience to the
board table, which is invaluable in advising
management and making business decisions.
Because they are not active in daily operations, they
are also unbiased judges of the management of
those operations. In light of the important role42 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City   FINANCIAL INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES   Fourth Quarter 2004
outside directors play in the governance process,
proponents of good governance advocate that outside
directors constitute the majority on corporate boards. 
Community Bank Survey data (see Table 1)
indicate that outside directors constitute the majority
at less than half of Tenth District banks. This is
largely due to the limited role played by outside
directors at family-owned banks, especially at smaller
family-owned banks. Outside directors play a larger
board role at non-family-owned banks, especially
larger non-family-owned banks. Approximately 86
percent of these banks reported outside director
majorities on their boards.
Table data also show the waning influence of
outside directors over the last five years. This
decline occurred despite emphasis by governance
reformers on a greater role for outside directors.
With the exception of large, non-family-owned
banks, more banks reported a decline in outside
directors than did those reporting an increase. Large
family-owned banks, on net, reported the greatest
outside director decline.
Board Committee Structure
Banking organizations use an extensive
committee structure to manage their risk exposures
and govern their operations. It is common for bank
boards to use their loan, asset-liability management
(ALM), and investments committees to monitor
and manage their credit, liquidity, and market risk
exposures. Many banks also have executive, audit,
nominating, compensation, and operations risk
committees to help monitor and govern operations. 
In general, there is no regulatory or legal
guidance that dictates committee structure or
composition for banking organizations. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),
however, requires that all publicly traded companies
have audit, compensation, and nominating
committees comprised solely of outside directors.
The Sarbanes-Oxley requirements pertain to
publicly traded banking organizations and, by
supervisory policy, to organizations that meet
conditions set out in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA).
While Sarbanes-Oxley is not applicable to non-
publicly traded banks, and FDICIA requirements
do not apply to smaller banks, proponents of good
governance believe there are positive benefits
associated with having these committees and that
outside directors should at least constitute the
majority on these committees.
8
Appendix C summarizes Community Bank
Survey data relating to committee structure and
composition. The data show that nearly all
community banks have board committees that
oversee management of credit, liquidity, and market
risk—loan, ALM, and investment committees.
Inside directors (chief executive officer (CEO) and
other bank officers) tend to be well represented on
these committees while outside directors are not,
especially at family-owned banks. The data also
show the dominant role played by the CEO at
community banks. Ninety percent or more of
respondents said their CEOs served on these three
committees. Outside directors, on the other hand,
constituted a majority of committee members at
fewer banks and were less likely to serve as
committee chairs. Once again, this tended to be
more typical for family-owned banks than non-
family-owned banks.
The story is somewhat different for the audit,
nominating, and compensation committees.
Outside directors have greater representation, more
often constitute a majority, and more frequently
serve as committee chairs than they do on the loan,
ALM, and investment committees. Yet, there is a
significant minority of community banks where
inside directors dominate these committees.
Furthermore, the data show that outside directors
seem to play a smaller role on these three
committees at family-owned banks. Not as many
family-owned banks reported outside directors on
these committees, fewer outside directors chaired
the committees, and CEO and other bank officers
were slightly more prevalent as committee members. Committee Rotation and
Assignments
Besides recommendations on board committee
structure, advocates of good governance support
periodic rotation of committee assignments to help
reduce complacency, to re-energize committee
oversight, and to minimize the existence of comfort
levels and relationships that may reduce the quality
of oversight. To promote diversity in decision-
making, backers of good governance practices
recommend that directors, through their votes on
candidates put forward by the nominating
committee, determine committee assignments.
Table 2 data indicate that only 25 percent of
Community Bank Survey respondents periodically
rotate committee assignments. This practice occurs
less frequently at small family-owned banks and
more often at non-family-owned and larger banks. 
Board chairs, CEOs, and directors all seem to
play a role in determining committee assignments.
In general, directors play the largest role in deciding
committee assignments, followed by CEOs and
then board chairs. This pattern holds for all but
large family-owned banks, where board chairs play
the largest assignment role. 
Board Membership and Recruitment
Advocates of good governance recommend that
board members be selected for their relevant
business and industry skills. They believe that the
nominating committee should track and monitor
these skills, using the organization’s changing need
for skills and experience as the criteria for
recommending new board members.
9 Another
common corporate governance recommendation is
to recruit board members with specialized skills,
such as accounting expertise, even when the
organization is not a publicly traded company.
10 
Community Bank Survey information (Table 3)
indicates that a principal reason for asking someone
to become a director depends upon ownership
structure. Ownership interest is the principal reason
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Table 2
Committee Rotation and Assignments
Assets<$150 M Assets>$150 M
All 




percent yes 25.00 17.09 33.33 45.00 43.75
Individual(s) who determine committee membership (percent)
Board chairman 28.16 27.09 24.56 39.02 26.67*
CEO 29.75 28.57 35.09 31.71 20.00*
Directors 36.39 37.44 38.60 26.83 40.00*
Other 5.69 6.89 1.75* 2.44* 13.33*
*Fewer than 10 observations.
Source: Survey of Community Banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District
Table 3
Reasons Why Individuals Are Asked to Join Community Bank Boards




F a m i l y  m e m b e r 44466
Background 55545
Important customer 66654
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for board service at small banks, while business
expertise is the main reason at large banks. Being a
community leader was an important reason at all
banks. Not too surprisingly, being a family member
was cited more often as a reason for board service at
family-owned banks than at non-family-owned
banks, but it did not rank as high as business
expertise and community leadership. 
Director Compensation and
Ownership
Supporters of good governance recommend that a
significant part of director compensation take the
form of long-term equity. The intent of this
recommendation is to align directors’ interests with
those of the corporation’s shareholders, providing
directors with incentives similar to shareholders in
guiding their decisions. 
Community Bank Survey data (Table 4) shows
that about 16 percent of Tenth District community
banks pay compensation beyond a standard director
retainer. This added compensation (e.g., performance
bonus) primarily takes the form of cash payments
and other remuneration (e.g., insurance). This is
generally true for both family and non-family-owned
banks, with the exception of a few larger family-
owned banks that offer stock. Given the nature of the
ownership in these community banks (i.e., family
members) reinvestment in the long-term growth of
the banking organization seems to receive greater
emphasis than distributions of earnings.
At first, the predominance of cash payments over
stock may seem contrary to what proponents
recommend as a way to align director interests with
those of shareholders. However, at community
banks, a significant portion of directors have 25
percent or more of their personal assets devoted to
ownership in the banks they oversee. The exception
to this is at larger, non-family-owned banks where
directors typically own far less.
In addition to recommendations for significant
stock ownership by directors, governance advocates
recommend an ownership stake for the CEO.
Community Bank Survey information in Table 5
Table 4
Director Compensation and Bank Ownership
Assets<$150M Assets>$150M
All Respondents Family Non-Family Family Non-Family
Annual director pay for board service
Minimum 0 0 0 $2,400 $1,200
Median $3,600 $3,000 $4,025 $6,000 $4,800
Average $4,362 $3,617 $4,763 $6,859 $5,988
Maximum $22,000 $22,000 $14,400 $14,000 $12,000
Directors paid regardless  43.39 45.46 40.00 45.95 25.00
of meeting attendance—percent yes
Pay additional compensation— 16.10 14.01 22.41 14.29 25.00
percent yes
Form of additional compensation
Common stock—percent that pay 1.52 0 0 12.50 0
Cash—percent that pay 81.82 86.84 85.71 62.50 66.67
Other—percent that pay 16.67 13.16 14.29 25.00 33.33
Percent of directors with 25 percent or more of their personal assets invested in bank
Outside directors 10.41 9.85 13.92 11.33 2.86
Inside directors 51.16 51.26 58.03 52.51 21.43
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indicates that CEOs, on average, own or control
about 25 percent of the outstanding stock in their
banks or parent bank holding companies. Driving
this number is the large ownership stake CEOs
have in family-owned banks. Average ownership by
CEOs at non-family-owned banks is less than half
of that at family-owned banks.
Senior Management Team Succession
Management succession and planning for the
orderly replacement of senior management team
members is an important matter and
recommended as a good governance practice.
11
Despite this, only 36 percent of Tenth District
community banks have written plans in place, even
though 20 percent of CEOs are over the age of 60
and an almost equal number indicate plans to
retire within the next five years (see Appendix D).
A greater proportion of family-owned bank
respondents reported they have plans in place than
did non-family-owned banks. 
Management succession takes on added
importance because of the gradual aging of senior
management teams at many District banks. These
officials have many years of experience, making it
crucial that their banks prepare for any future
management needs.
Appendix D contains Community Bank Survey
summary age and retirement plan information for
senior management and board members. Of
particular note is the number of CEOs and outside
directors that have retirement plans within the next
five years or are 60 years or older (making them
potential retirement candidates within the next five
years). At a minimum, almost one in five banks
could lose their CEO through retirement. They
could lose more than half of their outside directors
if those directors decide 65 is time to retire from
board service. 
The loss of these particular management
officials could be problematic for some community
banks. Table 6 data indicate that few organizations
foresee problems filling vacant staff positions.
However, a higher proportion, more than a
quarter, of Survey respondents see filling official
and outside director positions being a problem
during the next five years. This was especially true
for family-owned banks.
Other Governance Matters—Code




The “tone at the top” is established by the
character of board members and senior
management. A positive tone is critical in
establishing a proper control environment in which
a company’s internal control system must work and
Table 5
Community Bank Survey—President/CEO Bank Ownership
Assets<$150M Assets>$150M
All Respondents Family Non-Family Family Non-Family
Average ownership 24.06 28.81 11.05 24.42 10.83
Median ownership 8.00 11.94 5.16 8.00 1.55
Source: Survey of Community Banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District
Table 6
Percent of Respondents Indicating Some Problem
Obtaining Needed Staff and Outside Directors
During the Next Five Years
Assets<$150M Assets>$150M
All Responses Family Non-Family Family Non-Family
Staff 9.59 9.17 6.90 11.9 18.75
Official staff 26.09 27.67 20.69 23.81 31.25
Outside directors 24.45 25.49 18.97 31.71 12.50
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is an important component of its governance
process. Consequently, many promoters of good
governance recommend companies adopt a code of
ethics that establishes appropriate ethical values and
prohibits activities that create actual or the
appearance of conflicts of interest.
12 They
recommend the code of conduct be prominently
displayed throughout the organization and on its
web site. They suggest establishing procedures to
ensure that all employees, including officers and
directors, understand and abide by the code of
conduct. They also recommend that an ethics
officer be appointed and a board committee be
established to oversee ethics issues and code of
conduct compliance and to document any waivers
from the code.
Community Bank Survey data (see Table 7)
indicate that about two-thirds of Tenth District
community banks have established a code of
conduct. The percentage for family banks,
regardless of size, was somewhat lower than that for
non-family banks.
Director Assessments and Mandatory Retirement
Director assessments serve many purposes.
13 For
instance, they can serve as valuable input to a bank’s
nominating committee determination of a director’s
effectiveness or fitness for nomination to another
board term. Because of this, many proponents
believe director assessments have an important place
in good governance.
14 Table 7 data show that
director assessments were done by 25 to 37 percent
of Tenth District community banks and that there
was little difference in the director assessment
percentage between family- and non-family-owned
banks. However, larger banks, family- and non-
family-owned, were more likely to perform such
assessments than smaller banks.
Another area that proponents believe is
important for maintaining an active and effective
board is a mandatory retirement age for directors.
Many banks are responding to this governance
recommendation. One bank survey showed that 51
percent of respondents had a director mandatory
retirement age, up by 40 percent from a year-earlier
survey; the average maximum retirement age was
71.
15 Community Bank Survey data indicate that
only 8 percent of Tenth District community banks
have a mandatory retirement age for directors, and
smaller banks were less likely to have adopted a
mandatory retirement age than larger banks.
Director Education
Knowledgeable directors are a valuable source of
information, advice, and management counsel for a
corporation, making director education another
area stressed by good governance backers. With
widely publicized troubles at publicly traded
companies and increased scrutiny given to board
performance, this area of governance receives more
attention than in the past. In this regard, nearly 50
percent of banks reported their directors
participated in some form of training during 2003.
At non-family-owned banks, this percentage was
over 60 percent. Regardless of size and ownership,
District community banks relied most heavily on
trade associations and banking supervisors as a
director training resource (for a selected list of
Table 7




Respondents Family Non-Family Family Non-Family
Adopted code  65.62 60.59 62.72 87.18 87.50
of ethics
—percent yes
Director assessment 28.30 27.05 25.00 35.90 37.50
performed
—percent yes
Mandatory director  7.74 3.38 11.86 19.51 18.75
retirement age
—percent yes
Director training 49.53 40.98 62.71 69.23 62.50
in 2003
—percent yes
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training materials for bank directors see Box).
Consultants were used less frequently by both bank
ownership groups, with smaller non-family-owned
banks tending to use them more.
Tenth District Corporate
Governance at a Glance
Table 9 presents a summary picture or a
governance scorecard for Tenth District
community banks based on previously discussed
practices. Recommended governance practices are
listed in the left-most column of the table. The
four bank groups used throughout the analysis are
listed across the top of the table. The check marks
under each column indicate the proportion of
Community Bank Survey respondents reporting a
practice. One check mark means that 1 to 25
percent of the banks in the group reported the
governance practice. Two check marks indicate that
26 to 50 percent of banks in the group reported
the practice, and so on.
In general, the table data show that Tenth
District banks overall engage in many
recommended governance practices. However,
comparisons among groups show that governance
practices tend to be stronger at larger and non-
family-owned banks and weaker at smaller family-
owned banks. The relative weakness at these banks,
however, may be mitigated by other factors. For
instance, the principal-agent problems that many
governance proposals seek to address are not as big
an issue at small or family-owned banks where
owners are active in daily management. In such
situations, the corporation may be managed more
like a sole proprietorship or partnership.
Despite this positive report card for community
bank governance practices, one area that deserves
more attention is succession planning. This is
especially important in light of survey results which
show management teams aging at many
community banks. Too often, it is simply assumed
that an ownership group or family member will fill
management vacancies. However, there may be no
one in the group or family trained to take over and
successfully manage the bank. Consequently, bank
ownership may face difficult challenges in its search
for management replacements. In this regard,
prospective management replacements may see
limited advancement or ownership opportunities
where only a few individuals or family members
own and fill important management positions in
the bank. The perceived lack of opportunities is
exacerbated if the community which the bank
serves is slow-growing or in a state of decline.
CONCLUSION
Governance creates a system of checks and
balances to protect corporate stakeholders.
Implicit in the governance process are the
Table 8
Director Training Resources Used by Community Banks
Assets<$150M Assets>$150M
All Respondents Family Non-Family Family Non-Family
Bank supervisor 34.58 36.09 28.81 36.11 41.67
Trade association 33.75 34.59 30.51 36.11 33.33
Consultant 13.33 12.78 20.34 8.33 0.00
Academic institution 3.33 3.01 5.08 2.78 0.00
Governmental body 3.33 3.01 3.39 5.56 0.00
Other 11.67 10.53 11.86 11.11 25.00
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Table 9
Tenth District Community Bank Corporate Governance at a Glance
Governance Practice Under $150M in Assets Over $150M in Assets
Family Non-Family Family Non-Family
Has majority of independent directors.  √√ √√√ √√ √√√√
Business expertise is major recruiting criteria. √√ √ √√ √
Outside directors have equity ownership that represents  √√ √√
25 percent or more of their personal assets.
Inside directors have equity ownership that represents  √√√ √√√ √√√ √
25 percent or more of their personal assets.
Board paid for attendance. √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Had directors participate in training in 2003. √√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Performed director assessments. √√ √ √√ √√
Has mandatory director retirement. √√ √√
Has equity ownership by CEO. √√ √ √√ √
Has written succession plan. √√ √√ √√ √
Has a code of ethics.  √√√ √√√ √√√√ √√√√
Has a loan committee.  √√√√ √√√√ √√√√ √√√√
Has an ALM committee. √√√√ √√√√ √√√√ √√√√
Has an investment committee.  √√√√ √√√√ √√√√ √√√√
Has an operations risk committee.  √√√ √√√ √√√ ∗∗
Has an audit committee.  √√√√ √√√√ √√√√ √√√√
CEO does not serve on audit committee.  √√ √√ √√ √√
Outside directors are a majority of the audit committee.  √√ √√√ √√ √√√√
Has a nominating committee. √√ √√√ √√ ∗∗
CEO does not serve on nominating committee.  √ √ ∗∗ ∗∗
Outside directors are a majority of the nominating committee. √√ √√√ ∗∗ ∗∗
Has a compensation committee.  √√√ √√√√ √√√√ ∗∗
CEO does not serve on compensation committee.  √√ √ ∗ ∗
Outside directors are a majority of the compensation committee. √√ √√√√ √√√ ∗∗
√ =1-25 percent
√√ =26-50 percent
√√√  =51-75 percent
√√√√=76-100 percent
∗∗ =population very small
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assumptions that the participants in the process
act independently of one another, that they will
act ethically, that they have the necessary skill sets
to perform their duties, and that they are active in
meeting their responsibilities. Practices advocated by
proponents of strong governance ensure greater
adherence to these principles in order to address
problems inherent in the corporate model.
The recommended practices are aimed primarily
at protecting stakeholders in publicly traded
companies. Few Tenth District community banks,
however, are publicly traded. Further, a good
number are small in asset size and family-owned.
Often, owners manage the bank, reducing problems
that many governance recommendations are
intended to alleviate and lessening the value
community banks may see in implementing them.
This paper used Community Bank Survey
data to assess governance at Tenth District
community banks to see the extent to which
these banks have adopted recommended “good
governance” practices. Several broad conclusions
from this data are:
• Larger and more complex organizations are
more likely to have adopted recommended
governance principles.
• Non-family-owned organizations, regardless
of size, proportionately engage in more of the
recommended practices than do family-
owned organizations.
• Overall, community banks have adopted
many principles advocated by strong
governance proponents. 50 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City   FINANCIAL INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES   Fourth Quarter 2004
Appendix A
Roles and Responsibilities for Major Internal Players in a Corporation’s
Governance Process
Players Relationship Roles/Responsibilities
Investors (shareholders)  Outsiders and insiders • Provide equity funding for the organization’s activities with the 
expectation of earning a return on their investment; generally 
geographically dispersed and owning only small amounts of stock.
• Institutional investors who control more significant blocks of stock often 
have corporate governance policies and influence corporate policies 
through moral suasion or proxy initiatives.
Board of directors Outsiders and insiders • Elected by shareholders to oversee management’s performance on 
shareholders’ behalf.
• Engages competent management with integrity to direct the activities of 
the organization.
• Establishes strategic direction and ethical tone for the organization.
Board committees Outsiders
• Audit •  Audit committee oversees engagement and services of the external 
auditor, internal auditor, and financial reporting and disclosure.
• Compensation • Compensation committee oversees selection, compensation, and 
evaluation of the CEO and senior officers as well as planning for 
management succession.
• Nominating • Nominating committee oversees selection and nomination of committee 
members, new board members, and review of corporate governance 
issues; plans for the succession of the CEO.
Chairman of the board Outsider • Responsible for the information flow to the board, meeting agendas, 
meeting schedules, and chairing the executive meetings of the 
independent non-management directors.
Chief executive officer Insider • Responsible for ensuring the organization operates in a safe, sound, and 
ethical manner.
• Monitors senior management’s performance and compliance with 
standards established by the board of directors.
Senior management Insiders • Responsible for operating the corporation on a day-to-day basis within the
strategic objectives of the board of directors.
• Identify, develop, and implement the organization’s strategic plans and 
budget and manage operational risks.
Line management Insiders • Determine the level of risk acceptable in individual business processes.
• Assure themselves that the combination of earnings, capital and internal 
controls is sufficient to compensate for risk exposure.
Internal auditors Independent insiders • Monitor and provide periodic reports to the audit committee on the 
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Appendix B
External Players and Their Roles in the Governance Process
Third-Party Players Roles/Responsibilities
Creditors • Monitor cash flow, liquidity, and accounting information for corporate borrowings.
• Default covenants in loans can entitle lenders to director positions, compel involuntary bankruptcy or 
foreclosure, or bring about management and/or governance changes by moral suasion.
Listing agencies  • Subject to SEC approval, NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX establish listing requirements with which publicly 
traded organizations must comply. These requirements may include specified board committees, board 
meeting frequency, board member independence conditions and expertise, and other factors relating to 
corporate governance.
Government and regulators • Establish the legal framework within which corporations operate and police compliance with this 
framework. Important policing bodies include:
• Securities Exchange Commission (public companies).
• Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (insured institutions and state non-member banks).
• Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (national banks).
• Federal Reserve System (bank holding companies and state member banks).
• State bank departments (state chartered banks).
• Federal Home Loan Bank (bank membership and member loans).
• State insurance departments (insurance activities conducted by banks or bank holding companies).
• Housing and Urban Development (bank lending activities and guarantor programs).
• Small Business Administration (banks whose loans are guaranteed or that have a preferred lender 
relationship).
• Federal Trade Commission (financial institutions making consumer loans).
• Department of Justice (corporations subject to civil or criminal law).
• Department of Labor (corporations subject to labor laws).
• Internal Revenue Service (corporations subject to tax law and record keeping).
• State departments of revenue (corporations subject to tax law).
The above agencies are the major regulators who may supervise or have laws and regulations pertaining to 
a bank’s internal controls, accounting and reporting, safety and soundness, or governance practices.
,
External auditors • Independently evaluate and render an opinion on the fairness of the presentation of management’s 
financial statements.
• Independently evaluate and render opinions on management’s assertions on the existence and effectiveness 
of management’s internal controls over financial reporting.
• Evaluate adoption and implementation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
Stock analysts • Monitor and analyze the organization’s management and performance metrics in the context of the 
company’s performance trends, its competitors, its industry, and the economy as a whole.
Rating agencies • Monitor and analyze an organization’s management and performance metrics to assess the quality of the 
company’s earnings and its ability to service debt.52 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City   FINANCIAL INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES   Fourth Quarter 2004
Appendix C
Board Committee Structure and Composition
All Survey Banks
Outside Directors
CEO Serves Other Officers Serve Outside Directors Constitute a Majority Outside Director 
Have Committee on Committtee on Committee Serve on Committee of Committee Chairs Committee
Committee —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes
Loan 98.55 100.00 96.64 62.66 19.63 8.96
ALM 97.23 99.18 95.87 39.41 13.16 9.73
Investment 91.78 97.45 92.19 42.14 14.97 12.41
Audit 91.42 59.09 67.63 76.79 52.47 52.53
Nominating 45.05 89.47 54.55 78.79 58.06 53.33
Compensation 73.13 93.62 51.11 75.58 61.18 45.23
Operations risk 66.67 90.41 97.26 29.31 9.43 9.62
Family-Owned Banks with Assets Less Than $150 Million
Outside Directors
CEO Serves Other Officers Serve Outside Directors Constitute a Majority Outside Director 
Have Committee on Committtee on Committee Serve on Committee of Committee Chairs Committee
Committee —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes
Loan 98.31 100.00 97.69 60.00 15.44 6.87
ALM 97.47 99.35 96.03 36.89 11.21 8.11
Investment 94.25 98.44 92.06 41.18 11.58 10.87
Audit 87.60 56.25 71.43 70.79 49.41 45.78
Nominating 41.07 90.48 61.11 76.47 46.67 35.71
Compensation 62.82 97.92 53.33 65.00 47.50 34.21
Operations risk 64.87 88.89 95.65 30.56 6.06 3.13
Non-Family-Owned Banks with Assets Less Than $150 Million
Outside Directors
CEO Serves Other Officers Serve Outside Directors Constitute a Majority Outside Director 
Have Committee on Committtee on Committee Serve on Committee of Committee Chairs Committee
Committee —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes
Loan 98.00 100.00 89.58 80.00 33.33 14.63
ALM 95.83 100.00 91.30 56.10 23.68 21.05
Investment 90.24 94.60 86.11 53.13 30.00 26.67
Audit 95.62 63.41 69.05 78.05 53.85 52.63
Nominating 50.00 88.89 37.50 87.50 62.50 75.00
Compensation 87.10 84.00 45.83 92.00 79.17 58.33
Operations risk 61.11 90.91 100.00 22.22 12.50 25.00
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Appendix C  (Continued)
Family-Owned Banks with Assets Greater Than $150 Million
Outside Directors
CEO Serves Other Officers Serve Outside Directors Constitute a Majority Outside Director 
Have Committee on Committtee on Committee Serve on Committee of Committee Chairs Committee
Committee —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes
Loan 100.00 100.00 100.00 48.39 17.24 10.71
ALM 97.06 100.00 100.00 35.71 8.00 4.00
Investment 77.78 100.00 100.00 42.86 16.67 0.00
Audit 97.00 70.00 64.52 92.86 40.00 70.37
Nominating 46.15 ** ** ** ** **
Compensation 88.89 93.33 53.33 80.00 66.67 56.25
Operations risk 68.75 90.91 100.00 ** ** **
Non-Family-Owned Banks with Assets Greater Than $150 Million
Outside Directors
CEO Serves Other Officers Serve Outside Directors Constitute a Majority Outside Director 
Have Committee on Committtee on Committee Serve on Committee of Committee Chairs Committee
Committee —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes —Percent Yes
Loan 100.00 100.00 100.00 66.67 25.00 8.33
ALM 100.00 92.31 100.00 16.67 9.09 0.00
Investment 100.00 100.00 100.00 42.86 16.67 0.00
Audit 100.00 33.33 33.33 80.00 80.00 60.00
Nominating 75.00* ** ** ** ** **
Compensation 85.71* 100.00* 50.00* 66.67* 66.67* 33.33*
Operations risk 100.00* 100.00* 100.00* 40.00* 20.00* 20.00*
Source: Survey of Community Banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District
*Fewer than 10 observations.
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Appendix D
Management Succession and Senior Management Team Characteristics: Age,
Experience, and Retirement Possibilities
Assets<$150M Assets>$150M
All Responses Family-Owned Non-Family-Owned Family-Owned Non-Family-Owned
Management Succession Plans
Percent of banks with written plans 36.39 38.31 31.03 39.02 25.00
Senior Management Team
Chief Executive Officer
Average years in position 16.60 16.86 13.75 15.88 26.06
Average age 54.16 54.72 52.42 53.36 55.46
Percent 60 years or older 19.61 20.50 12.28 25.64 20.00
Percent planning to retire within five years 18.99 22.77 15.52 5.00 18.75
Chief Financial Officer
Average years in position 14.53 16.81 11.88 10.48 15.23
Average age 49.16 49.67 49.03 47.03 50.85
Percent 60 years or older 12.07 16.13 10.53 6.67 0.00
Percent planning to retire within five years 10.93 12.24 10.26 6.25 14.29
Chief Lending Officer
Average years in position 11.71 13.05 9.12 11.74 6.80
Average age 50.03 50.58 50.13 48.46 48.27
Percent 60 years or older 9.01 8.97 8.51 10.81 6.67
Percent planning to retire within five years 10.94 11.26 16.00 2.56 12.00
Chief Operating Officer
Average years in position 15.21 16.79 12.45 12.14 14.27
Average age 49.05 49.30 50.02 47.08 47.36
Percent 60 years or older 12.04 13.37 13.46 8.33 0.00
Percent planning to retire within five years 16.43 17.88 18.52 10.53 6.67
Director—Inside
Average years of experience 15.89 16.77 11.63 16.73 11.93
Average age 55.31 55.64 53.84 54.91 55.00
Median age 55.00 55.00 53.00 54.00 55.00
Maximum age 95.00 95.00 93.00 84.00 70.00
Percent 60 years or older 32.91 34.04 23.31 36.43 32.50
Director—Outside
Average years of experience 13.35 14.30 11.76 13.97 11.69
Average age 60.30 59.71 60.07 62.42 60.98
Median age 60.00 60.00 60.00 63.00 60.50
Maximum age 97.00 97.00 87.00 93.00 91.00
Percent 60 years or older 52.61 50.98 51.43 59.72 53.54
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Box
Director Resources
The banking agencies and industry trade associations offer a variety of reference materials and
periodic programs that directors may find useful in meeting their responsibilities. A sampling of these is
listed below. 
• Insights for Bank Directors (Insights)
Insights is the Federal Reserve’s online course for community bank directors 
(http://www.stlouisfed.org/col/director).
Insights is designed primarily for new directors (although more seasoned directors may find it a
useful refresher), providing them with tools and reference materials they can use to be more
effective in their management oversight. Done in the context of a board meeting for a hypothetical
bank, the course covers basic bank financial analysis and reviews the sources, monitoring and
control of credit, liquidity, and market risk, basic portfolio risks common to all banks. Exercises and
short self-quizzes help amplify points and let directors apply what they have learned in the course,
not only for the case bank but also their own bank. Ultimately, the goal of the course is to provide
directors with enough information to help them spot evolving problems and encourage them to ask
questions about matters they see occurring at their banks.
•  Banking Supervisor Web Sites
Federal and state banking agencies maintain web sites that contain information directors many find
useful in their oversight. Included among these are:
• Federal Reserve System (http://www.federalreserve.gov/); 
• Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (http://www.fdic.gov/); 
• Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (http://www.occ.treas.gov/); 
• Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (http://www.ffiec.gov/default.htm); and
• Conference of State Bank Supervisors (http://www.csbs.org/).
•  Bank Director Online University (University)
The University is the Independent Community Bankers Association’s online course for bank
directors. The site is located at: http://www.icba.org/tools/index.cfm?ItemNumber=134756 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City   FINANCIAL INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES   Fourth Quarter 2004
1 This survey was mailed to approximately 1,300 Tenth
District community banks in February 2004. Approximately
27 percent or 341 banks returned their surveys. 
2 Remarks by Governor Susan Schmidt Bies, “Corporate
Governance and Risk Management,” at the Annual
Symposium on Derivatives and Risk Management, Fordham
University Stern School of Law, New York, N.Y., 
October 8, 2002.
3 The influence these players exert on the governance process,
especially that of government, cannot be underestimated in
heavily regulated industries such as banking. For example,
banking laws and regulations place limits on board size,
restrict lending to insiders (executive offices, directors, and
principal shareholders) and affiliates, control operating
locations, limit dividend payout, limit amounts loaned to a
single borrower, require detailed financial reporting and
attestation on the adequacy of internal controls to ensure
accurate financial reports, etc.
4 In the typical corporation, stockholders often rely on hired
managers to run the business on a daily basis. However, this
structure can lead to potential problems and conflicts of
interest: Hired managers may attempt to serve their own
interests rather than those of stockholders. Without the same
financial incentives stockholders have to maximize the firm’s
value, hired managers may be less willing to take appropriate
risks, may not give their full effort, may enhance their own
return by spending on amenities (nice offices, etc.), or may
pursue personal prestige or power. This is commonly referred
to as the principal-agent problem. 
5 In smaller, closely held, and family-owned community
banks, the separate role played by governance players tends
to blur. Many times owners are also managers, reducing
principal-agent problems. Consequently, owners may feel
that implementation of many governance recommendations
is unneeded.
6 A note of caution is in order regarding the data reported in
the tables that follow for organizations with year-end 2003
assets greater than $150 million. This information came
from only 58 banks. Consequently, survey information for
larger banks may represent governance practices at a small
number of larger community banks.
7 Board size range for national banks is between five and 25
directors, see Section 31, the Banking Act of 1933, (12
U.S.C.71a).
8 The audit committee is generally charged with oversight of
the organization’s internal controls and audit function. These
responsibilities require a high degree of objectivity to ensure
that conflicts of interest and potential for fraudulent acts are
minimized. The compensation committee is generally
responsible for ensuring that executive compensation is fair
and appropriate, but not excessive in light of executive
compensation at peer organizations. A high degree of
independence for these committee members helps ensure
that executive and shareholder interests are appropriately
balanced. The nominating committee is charged with
recruiting and evaluating directors who will proactively serve
the best interests of the organization. Having outside board
members serve on these committees can help the
organization eliminate any appearance that business
decisions are not in the interest of all shareholders.
9 Principles of Corporate Governance, The Business Roundtable,
May 2002.
10 Michael T. Harris, “Fish or Cut Bait: Luring Directors to
Corporate Boards Has Become a Daunting Task—One That
Requires Ingenuity and Time,” The Chief Executive, May
2002, pp. 1-2.
11 As part of the management succession process, the CEO is
typically expected to develop the senior management team
so that one team member could assume the CEO position.
The compensation or governance committee reviews
potential candidates to assess their ability to assume the
CEO position if needed. In the event that the organization
must look externally, the board may organize a search
committee comprised of the chairman of the compensation
committee and a few other qualified board members. Most
search committees seek the assistance of an outside
consultant to help design a proposed compensation package
and to assist in the evaluation of potential candidates.
12 “Findings and Recommendations: Part 2 Corporate
Governance,” the Conference Board Commission on Public
Trust and Private Enterprise, January 9, 2003, pp. 1-29.
13 Assessments can give individual board members an
opportunity to reflect on their individual and corporate
responsibilities, identify different perceptions and opinions
among board members, point to questions that need board
attention, serve as a springboard for board improvements,
increase the level of board teamwork, provide an opportunity
for clarifying mutual board and staff expectations,
demonstrate to the staff and others that accountability is a
serious organizational value, and provide credibility with
stakeholders. Taken from Director Self-Assessments, Timothy
Palmersheim, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
14 One example of an assessment form can be found as an
attachment to the presentation Achieving Long-Term Success
at http://www.kansascityfed.org/bs&s/confer/2004RegUpdate
/2004RegUpdatematerials.htm.
15 Kimberly S. Crowe and Deborah Scally, “2003 Bank
Director Annual Compensation Survey,” Bank Director
Magazine, 4th quarter 2003.
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